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Abstract
We describe a project to capitalize on newly available levels of computational resources in order to un-
derstand human cognition. We will build an integrated physical system including vision, sound input and
output, and dextrous manipulation, all controlled by a continuously operating large scale parallel MIMD
computer. The resulting system will learn to \think" by building on its bodily experiences to accomplish
progressively more abstract tasks. Past experience suggests that in attempting to build such an integrated
system we will have to fundamentally change the way articial intelligence, cognitive science, linguistics,
and philosophy think about the organization of intelligence. We expect to be able to better reconcile the
theories that will be developed with current work in neuroscience.
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1 Project Overview
We propose to build an integrated physical humanoid
robot including active vision, sound input and output,
dextrous manipulation, and the beginnings of language,
all controlled by a continuously operating large scale par-
allel MIMD computer. This project will capitalize on
newly available levels of computational resources in or-
der to meet two goals: an engineering goal of building
a prototype general purpose exible and dextrous au-
tonomous robot and a scientic goal of understanding
human cognition. While there have been previous at-
tempts at building kinematically humanoid robots, none
have attempted the embodied construction of an au-
tonomous intelligent robot; the requisite computational
power simply has not previously been available.
The robot will be coupled into the physical world with
high bandwidth sensing and fast servo-controlled actua-
tors, allowing it to interact with the world on a human
time scale. A shared time scale will open up new possi-
bilities for how humans use robots as assistants, as well
as allowing us to design the robot to learn new behaviors
under human feedback such as human manual guidance
and vocal approval. One of our engineering goals is to
determine the architectural requirements sucient for an
enterprise of this type. Based on our earlier work on mo-
bile robots, our expectation is that the constraints may
be dierent than those that are often assumed for large
scale parallel computers. If ratied, such a conclusion
could have important impacts on the design of future
sub-families of large machines.
Recent trends in articial intelligence, cognitive sci-
ence, neuroscience, psychology, linguistics, and sociol-
ogy are converging on an anti-objectivist, body-based
approach to abstract cognition. Where traditional ap-
proaches in these elds advocate an objectively speci-
able reality|brain-in-a-box, independent of bodily
constraints|these newer approaches insist that intelli-
gence cannot be separated from the subjective expe-
rience of a body. The humanoid robot provides the
necessary substrate for a serious exploration of the
subjectivist|body-based|hypotheses.
There are numerous specic cognitive hypotheses that
could be implemented in one or more of the humanoids
that will be built during the ve-year project. For ex-
ample, we can vary the extent to which the robot is pro-
grammed with an attentional preference for some images
or sounds, and the extent to which the robot is pro-
grammed to learn to selectively attend to environmental
input as a by-product of goal attainment (e.g., success-
ful manipulation of objects) or reward by humans. We
can compare the behavioral result of constructing a hu-
manoid around dierent hypotheses of cortical represen-
tation, such as coincidence detection versus interpolat-
ing memory versus sequence seeking in counter streams
versus time-locked multi-regional retroactivation. In the
later years of the project we can connect with theories
of consciousness by demonstrating that humanoids de-
signed to continuously act on immediate sensory data
(as suggested by Dennett's multiple drafts model) show
more human-like behavior than robots designed to con-
struct an elaborate world model.
The act of building and programming behavior-based
robots will force us to face not only issues of interfaces
between traditionally assumed modularities, but even
the idea of modularity itself. By reaching across tradi-
tional boundaries and tying together many sensing and
acting modalities, we will quickly illuminate shortcom-
ings in the standard models, shedding light on formerly
unrealized sociologically shared, but incorrect, assump-
tions.
2 Background: the power of enabling
technology
An enabling technology|such as the brain that we will
build|has the ability to revolutionize science. A recent
example of the far-reaching eects of such technologi-
cal advances is the eld of mobile robotics. Just as the
advent of cheap and accessible mobile robotics dramat-
ically altered our conceptions of intelligence in the last
decade, we believe that current high-performance com-
puting technology makes the present an opportune time
for the construction of a similarly signicant integrated
intelligent system.
Over the last eight years there has been a renewed
interest in building experimental mobile robot systems
that operate in unadorned and unmodied natural and
unstructured environments. The enabling technology for
this was the single chip micro-computer. This made it
possible for relatively small groups to build serviceable
robots largely with graduate student power, rather than
the legion of engineers that had characterized earlier ef-
forts along these lines in the late sixties. The accessibil-
ity of this technology inspired academic researchers to
take seriously the idea of building systems that would
work in the real world.
The act of building and programming behavior-based
robots fundamentally changed our understanding of
what is dicult and what is easy. The eects of this
work on traditional articial intelligence can be seen in
innumerable areas. Planning research has undergone
a major shift from static planning to deal with \reac-
tive planning." The emphasis in computer vision has
moved from recovery from single images or canned se-
quences of images to active|or animate|vision, where
the observer is a participant in the world controlling the
imaging process in order to simplify the processing re-
quirements. Generally, the focus within AI has shifted
from centralized systems to distributed systems. Fur-
ther, the work on behavior-based mobile robots has also
had a substantial eect on many other elds (e.g., on the
design of planetary science missions, on silicon micro-
machining, on articial life, and on cognitive science).
There has also been considerable interest from neuro-
science circles, and we are just now starting to see some
bi-directional feedback there.
The grand challenge that we wish to take up is to
make the quantum leap from experimenting with mo-
bile robot systems to an almost humanoid integrated
head system with saccading foveated vision, facilities
for sound processing and sound production, and a com-
pliant, dextrous manipulator. The enabling technol-
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ogy is massively parallel computing; our brain will have
large numbers of processors dedicated to particular sub-
functions, and interconnected by a xed topology net-
work.
3 Scientic Questions
Building an android, an autonomous robot with hu-
manoid form, has been a recurring theme in science c-
tion from the inception of the genre with Frankenstein,
through the moral dilemmas infesting positronic brains,
the human but not really human C3PO and the ever
present desire for real humanness as exemplied by Com-
mander Data. Their bodies have ranged from that of a
recycled actual human body through various degrees of
mechanical sophistication to ones that are indistinguish-
able (in the stories) from real ones. And perhaps the
most human of all the imagined robots, HAL-9000, did
not even have a body.
While various engineering enterprises have modeled
their artifacts after humans to one degree or another
(e.g., WABOT-II at Waseda University and the space
station tele-robotic servicer of Martin-Marietta) no one
has seriously tried to couple human like cognitive pro-
cesses to these systems. There has been an implicit, and
sometimes explicit, assumption, even from the days of
Turing (see Turing (1970)1) that the ultimate goal of
articial intelligence research was to build an android.
There have been many studies relating brain models to
computers (Berkeley 1949), cybernetics (Ashby 1956),
and articial intelligence (Arbib 1964), and along the
way there have always been semi-popular scientic books
discussing the possibilities of actually building real `live'
androids (Caudill (1992) is perhaps the most recent).
This proposal concerns a plan to build a series of
robots that are both humanoid in form, humanoid in
function, and to some extent humanoid in computational
organization. While one cannot deny the romance of
such an enterprise we are realistic enough to know that
we can but scratch the surface of just a few of the scien-
tic and technological problems involved in building the
ultimate humanoid given the time scale and scope of our
proposal, and given the current state of our knowledge.
The reason that we should try to do this at all is that
for the rst time there is plausibly enough computation
available. High performance parallel computation gives
us a new tool that those before us have not had avail-
able and that our contemporaries have chosen not to use
in such a grand attempt. Our previous experience in
attempting to emulate much simpler organisms than hu-
mans suggests that in attempting to build such systems
we will have to fundamentally change the way articial
intelligence, cognitive science, psychology, and linguis-
tics think about the organization of intelligence. As a
result, some new theories will have to be developed. We
expect to be better able to reconcile the new theories
with current work in neuroscience. The primary bene-
ts from this work will be in the striving, rather than in
the constructed artifact.
1Dierent sources cite 1947 and 1948 as the time of writ-
ing, but it was not published until long after his death.
3.1 Minds
The traditional approach taken in articial intelligence
to building intelligent programs has aectionately been
dubbed `Good Old Fashioned AI', or GOFAI (Haugeland
1985). It is epitomized in the modularity arguments of
Fodor (1983) and in the physical symbol system hypoth-
esis of Newell & Simon (1981). These approaches reduce
AI to the problem of constructing a brain-in-a-box sym-
bolic manipulator which would act intelligently if given
appropriate connection to a robot (or other perceptuo-
motor system). Still further modularization leads to in-
dependent work on such tasks as natural language pro-
cessing, planning, learning, and commonsense reasoning
(e.g., Allen, Hendler & Tate (1990), Hobbs & Moore
(1985) or Brachman & Levesque (1985)). We have ar-
gued (Brooks 1991a) that much of GOFAI was shaped
by the technological resources available to its researchers.
High performance computing and communications gives
us a new opportunity to re-shape attempts at building
intelligent systems.
Many modern theories are at odds with GOFAI. For
example, Minsky (1986) suggests that the mind is a soci-
ety of smaller agents competing and cooperating. Kins-
bourne (1988) and Dennett (1991) argue that there is
no place in the brain where consciousness resides. Lin-
guists and psycholinguists have argued that the long-
fashionable separation of language into the separate com-
ponents of grammar and semantics is a ction convenient
for symbolic formulation but not useful for advancing our
understanding of the real diversity of language phenom-
ena (Langacker 1987), (Harris 1991). Brooks (1991a)
proposes that human-level intelligence can be built with-
out a single central representation of the world. Stein (to
appear) argues that all of cognition can be seen as the
recapitulation|through imagination|of action in the
world.
Many other theories of mind (e.g., Searle (1992), Edel-
man (1987), Edelman (1989), Edelman (1992)) argue
against the traditional AI notion of categorical represen-
tation, and instead for a more situated model of compu-
tation. Unfortunately these and others are awed by fun-
damental misunderstandings about the nature of com-
putation and the uses of abstraction, usually centered
around formal models of Turing machines and sometimes
their interaction with Godel's theorem. Such arguments
were long ago successfully debunked (Arbib 1964), but
continue to resurface.2
At the other end of the spectrum is connectionism.
Computational scientists have worked with simple ab-
stractions of the brain for many years in two main
waves, one in the sixties (Rosenblatt 1962), (Minsky
& Papert 1969) and a second in the eighties (Rumel-
hart & McClelland 1986). Unfortunately, most of this
work is concerned with local aspects of the problem,
rather than giving insight into how a complete system
2A more egregious version of this is (Penrose 1989) who
not only makes the same Turing-Godel error, but then in a
desperate attempt to nd the essence of mind and applying
the standard methodology of physics, namely to nd a sim-
plifying underlying principle, resorts to an almost mystical
reliance on quantum mechanics.
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might be organized.3 There have been recent attempts
to bridge the gap in more serious ways between com-
putation and neuroscience|in particular Churchland &
Sejnowski (1992)|but still the gap is too large to con-
sider neural-based approaches for a system of the scope
we are proposing. Two of us have already been work-
ing together (Dennett & Kinsbourne 1992), relating a
neuroscientic theory of consciousness, dominant focus
(Kinsbourne 1988), to a philosophical analysis of mind.
A major intent of our proposed work is to extend that
analysis to the point of its being an implementable the-
ory on our humanoids.
Recent work in neuropsychology has produced sur-
prising results. Lesion studies, e.g. those by Damasio
& Damasio (1989) and (McCarthy & Warrington 1990),
indicate that the modularity of storage and access in
the human brain is dramatically dierent from what our
intuitions|as exemplied by both cognitive science and
GOFAI|tell us. For instance it is clear that a picture of
a dolphin provides immediate access to a dierent set of
representations at a dierent level of generalization from
those prompted by the verbal stimulus, `dolphin'. In a
normal person these representations are cross-linked, but
in patients with certain lesions these cross-links may be
destroyed for particular classes of entities (e.g., for an-
imals, but not tools).4 Likewise (Newcombe & Ratcli
1989) demonstrate multiple parallel channels of control
dependent on the task, rather than, say, a single cen-
tralized nger control module for each nger. There is
a grounding of motor control in the dierent types of
interactions the agent has with the world.5 Nor is the
control of attention centralized, as illustrated by studies
of unilateral neglect (Kinsbourne 1987), but rather it is
a matter of competition between brain systems.
The argument is that the human brain stores things
not only by category but also by modality|the `repre-
sentations' are grounded in the sensory modality used
to learn the information. Kuipers & Byun (1991),
Mataric (1992b) and Stein (to appear) implement limited
forms of this body-based representation in mobile robots.
Drescher (1991), too, uses environmental interaction to
construct representation. Still, each of these projects
was limited by the relative poverty of the sensory suite.
In this project, we will use the neuropsychological evi-
dence to build a far more sophisticated instantiation of
the body-based theory of representation and to examine
3There are exceptions to this: for instance, the work of
Beer (1990); but that is restricted to insect level cognition.
4One particular patient (McCarthy & Warrington 1988)
when shown a picture of a dolphin, was able to form sentences
using the word `dolphin' and talk about its habitat, its ability
to be trained, and its role in the US military. When verbally
asked what a dolphin was, however, he thought it was `either
a sh or a bird.' He had no such discrepancies in knowledge
when the subject was, for example, a wheelbarrow.
5For instance, some patients can not exercise conscious
control over their ngers for simple tasks, yet seem unim-
paired in threading a needle, or playing the piano. Further-
more in some cases selective drug induced suppression shows
ways in which many simple reexes combine to give the ap-
pearance of a centralized will producing globally coherent
behavior (Philip Teitelbaum & Pellis 1990)
it relative to traditional theories of modularity.
There is also evidence that what appear to be reason-
ably well understood sensory channels within the brain
are much more complex than we currently image. As
one example, there is the eect known as blindsight ,
where despite the lack of pieces or a whole visual cor-
tex, both humans and animals can perceive, perhaps
not consciously, certain things within their visual eld
(Weiskrantz 1986), (Braddick, Atkison, Hood, Hark-
ness & an Faraneh Vargha-Khadem 1992). There has
been some recent argument that these phenomena may
be produced by partially intact visual cortex (Fendrich,
Wessinger & Gazzaniga 1992), but even that would still
call into question the arguments of Marr (1982)|long
used in computer vision|that the purpose of the vision
system is to reconstruct a 3-dimensional representation
of what is out in the world.
The notion that embodiment in the physical world is
important to creating human-like intelligence is not at all
new. Even the 1947 paper of Turing (1970) is quite con-
cerned about this point. Later Simon (1969) discussed
a similar point using as a parable an ant walking along
the beach. He pointed out that the complexity of the
behavior of the ant is more a reection of the complex-
ity of its environment than its own internal complexity
and speculated that the same may be true of humans.
The idea that our very modularity and internal orga-
nization depends on our ways of physically interacting
with the world is carried even further in series of philo-
sophical arguments (Lako & Johnson 1980), (Lako
1987), (Johnson 1987). Their central hypothesis is that
all of our thought and language is grounded in physical
patterns generated in our sensory and and motor sys-
tems as we interact with the world. In particular these
physical bases of our reason and intelligence can still
be discerned in our language as we `confront' the fact
that much of our language can be 'viewed' as physical
metaphors, `based' on our own bodily interactions with
the world.
We plan on taking these notions seriously as we build
and program our humanoids, using physical interactions
as a basis for higher level cognitive-like behaviors. We
have already demonstrated a simple version of these
ideas using currently available \insect-level" robotics
(Stein to appear).
3.2 Symbols and Mental Representation
The physical symbol system hypothesis maintains that
any physical symbol system can implement intelligent
behavior. As a consequence, it says that symbols provide
a layer of abstraction that hides the details of perceptual
and motor processes.
To understand the diculties that the physical sym-
bol system hypothesis presents for our task, we might
examine another similar abstraction. It is common to
regard digital design as concerned solely with binary
digits|discrete ones and zeros. Indeed, this digital ab-
straction allows the use of boolean logic to synthesize
the combinational circuits out of which our computa-
tional elements are built. By hiding the details of analog
voltages that constitute our systems, the digital abstrac-
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tion facilitates reasoning about and construction with
these elements. However, the fact that the digital ab-
straction is useful for combinational synthesis does not
mean that it suces for all purposes. Indeed, for certain
elements|such as a bipolar switch|it may be necessary
to look beneath the digital abstraction to understand the
interactions of electrical components|e.g., to debounce
the switch. Further, certain portions of the resulting
system|such as the debouncing circuitry|may never
be interpretable directly in terms of the digital abstrac-
tion.
Approaches that rely on the physical symbol-system
hypothesis cannot constitute complete explanations of
intelligence, precisely because they abstract away the de-
tails of symbols' implementation. In order for a brain-in-
a-box to connect to a body, all symbols must be derivable
from sensory stimuli; but in addition, there are portions
of the system|such as the bouncy switch|that can-
not be seen from the symbolic side of the abstraction.
Thus, while symbolic approaches to cognition may pro-
vide us with tremendous insight as to how intelligence
might work once we have symbols, it can neither tell us
how to construct those symbols nor assist us in the iden-
tication and manipulation of the non-symbolic portion
of our system.
At the opposite extreme are several non-symbolic ap-
proaches to cognition. From connectionism to reactive
systems to articial life, these systems operate on stimuli
much closer to \real" sensory input, often using dicult-
to-comprehend processes to compute appropriate actions
based on these stimuli. Because they are closer to actual
sensation, these approaches have had marked success in
certain areas (e.g., video-game playing (Agre & Chap-
man 1987); navigation (Pomerleau 1991); \insect" intel-
ligence (Connell 1990), (Angle & Brooks 1990)). How-
ever, because they lack symbols or any comparable ab-
straction, these systems are often inscrutable. A corol-
lary is the diculty that practitioners have had in trans-
ferring knowledge gained in the construction of one sys-
tem to the design of the next. Because there is little
explicit structure, these systems generally defy descrip-
tion by abstraction.
We believe that the most fruitful approach will be one
that builds on both of these traditions (e.g., Rosenschein
& Kaelbling (1986), Kuipers & Byun (1991), Drescher
(1991), Stein (to appear), Yanco & Stein (1993)). Just as
the digital abstraction is useful for the designer of combi-
national circuits, so the symbolic abstraction will be in-
valuable for the designer of cognitive components. How-
ever, combinational circuits are built out of raw voltages,
not out of ones and zeros: the binary digits are in the
mind of the designer. Similarly, the symbolic abstrac-
tion will be a crucial tool in the analysis and synthesis
of our humanoids; but we do not necessarily expect these
symbols to appear explicitly in the humanoid's head.
Thus, both of these pieces will inform our ap-
proach to representation. However, it is not at all
clear that a single \symbol" (in the conventional sense,
e.g., `dolphin') will have a unitary representation (e.g.,
in the human brain the image of a dolphin may be
stored separately from categorical knowledge about dol-
phins as sea creatures). As a result, we will need to
broaden the conventional denitions. We expect to use
lower level modules|derived, e.g., from more `reactive'
approaches|to come up with appropriate responses to
stimuli. From these, we will identify patterns of behav-
ior that represent generalizations|proto-symbols|and
use these to establish reasoning that appears to be more
\symbolic".
There is an argument that certain components of
stimulus-response systems are \symbolic." For example,
if a particular neuron res|or a particular wire carries
a positive voltage|whenever something red is visible,
that neuron|or wire|may be said to \represent" the
presence of something red. While this argument may be
perfectly reasonable as an observer's explanation of the
system, it should not be mistaken for an explanation of
what the agent in question believes. In particular, the
positive voltage on the wire does not represent the pres-
ence of red to the agent ; the positive voltage is the pres-
ence of something red as far as the robot is concerned.
The digital abstraction is not a statement about how
things are; it is merely a way of viewing them. A com-
binational circuit may be analyzed in terms of boolean
logic, but it is voltages, not a collection of ones and ze-
ros. (Or, perhaps, it is electrons moving in a particular
way.) At best, the digital abstraction tells us that the
combinational circuit is amenable to analysis in term of
ones and zeros; but it does not change the reality of what
is there.
Similarly, the utility of the symbolic abstraction in an-
alyzing rational behavior does not indicate that there are
actually entities corresponding to symbols in the brain.
Rather, it indicates that the brain|or, more likely,
portions of the brain (viz. the debounced switch)|are
amenable to analysis in symbolic terms. It does not
change the fact that everything in the brain is (sub-
symbolic) neural activity; nor does the equation of brain
function with neural activity rule out the utility of a
symbolic explanation.
In building a humanoid, we will begin at this sensory
level. All intelligence will be grounded in computation on
sensory information or on information derived from sen-
sation. However, some of this computation will abstract
away from explicit sensation, generalizing, e.g., over sim-
ilar situations or sensory inputs. Through sensation and
action, the humanoid will experience a conceptualization
of space: \up," \down," \near," \far," etc. We hypoth-
esize that at this point it will be useful for observers to
describe the behavior of the humanoid in symbolic terms.
(\It put the red blocks together.") This is the rst step
in representation.
The next step involves a jump from the view of sym-
bols as a convenient but post hoc explanation (i.e., for
an observer) to a view in which symbols, somehow, ap-
pear to the agent to exist inside the agent's head. This
second step is facilitated by language, one of the tools
that allows us to become observers of ourselves. This is
the trick of consciousness: the idea that \we" exist, that
one part of us is observing another.
Although there is good evidence that consciousness is
anything but a simple phenomenon (i.e., that the reality
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is far more complex than our post hoc reconstruction of
it) (Springer & Deutsch 1981), it almost certainly does
have some of the properties that we attribute to it.
With language, symbols become more than merely a
post hoc explanation by others of the workings of our
own brains; symbols become our own explanation to our-
selves. It is this ability to distance ourselves from our
own symbols that gives rise to our illusions of conscious-
ness (Bickhard n.d.). How can we produce these \sym-
bolic" associations? The same processes that produce
responses from sensory inputs can be stimulated inter-
nally. For example, Kosslyn (1993) has demonstrated
that portions of the visual cortex are implicated in visual
imagery, suggesting precisely this sort of self-stimulation.
Stein (to appear) takes a similar approach to add cogni-
tive capacity to a behavior-based robot.
We can summarize our approach to representation as
follows: Stimulus-response systems abstract away from
particular inputs to treat large classes of inputs simi-
larly. This begins the \generalization" of particular stim-
uli into complex reactions and the external appearance
of categorization, or proto-symbols. Next, these abstrac-
tions begin to be produced without resorting to actual
sensory inputs. Symbol-like behavior results, but with-
out instantiating symbols directly.
4 High Performance Computing
We are proposing a very dierent way to use high perfor-
mance computation and communication, and proposing
to use it in a domain which promises to become a major
consumer of computation: intelligent embodied agents
that interact with humans.
While traditional parallel processors are designed to
act like fast serial computers, we are addressing an in-
herently parallel task. Indeed, while for most of com-
puter science the translation to parallel hardware has
imposed additional complexity (and, indeed, much cur-
rent research is devoted to minimizing the overhead of
this translation), we anticipate a signicant simplica-
tion of our task in virtue of the parallel hardware avail-
able.
Much of the work on high performance computation
is benchmarked in terms of how it speeds up numerical
simulations of physical phenomena (Cypher, Ho, Kon-
stantinidou & Messina 1993). In these domains there is
a well dened set of computations that given a valid set
of initial conditions are guaranteed to be well behaved in
some sense, generating a suciently accurate simulation
of how events will unfold over time. Data is collected
along the way, and a nal summary of how the modeled
system evolved over time is the result of the computa-
tion. The model of a computation is very much that of an
algorithm that is given input data and, after some suit-
able computation, outputs some data. As a result, much
of the research into high performance parallel computers
is concerned with how to present a shared memory that
can be accessed quickly by all processors, leading to the
need for local caching schemes and high speed switching
networks; how to make sure that all such views of mem-
ory are consistent, leading to the need for handling cache
coherence; and how to dynamically balance the load on
all processors, given the implicit understanding that the
goal of the whole job is to complete the computation as
quickly as possible.
In our \problem" the constraints are very dierent.
By the nature of the system we do not need to migrate
processes, do not need a shared memory, and do not
need to dynamically redirect messages. Simple \hard
wired" messages networks should suce, with memory
only local to each processor. The goal is not to \nish"
a computation as quickly as possible but instead to pass
the data through a process in a bounded amount of time
so that the next data that the world presents to the sys-
tem can ow through without getting blocked or lost.
There is no end to a computation or nal result; all is
continuously being computed and recomputed, and ac-
tions in the world are the \outputs" of the system. But
the computation is not simply linear in ordering. There
must be many pathways between sensors and actuators,
some with very dierent latencies, each one contributing
to some aspect of the resulting behavior of the system.
We need high performance and parallel computing in
order to guarantee the bounds on computation time of
any particular step in the processes. We will push on the
organization of computation to do useful tasks directly in
the real world, and will be pushing in a direction which
should lead to inherently simpler-to-construct massively
parallel computers. The applications of this sort of pro-
cessing will be wide ranging and indeed may well become
pervasive throughout our society.
Our problem is more one of maintenance of activity
rather than achievement of a single solution to a prob-
lem.
We need parallelism because of the vast amounts of
processing that needs to be done in order to make sense
of a continuous and rich stream of perceptual data. We
need parallelism to coordinate the many actuation sys-
tems that need to work in synchrony (e.g., the ocular
system and the neck must move in a coordinated fashion
at time to maintain image stability) and which need to
be servoed at high rates. We need parallelism in order
to have a continuously operating system that can be up-
graded without having to recompile, reload, and restart
all of the software that runs the stable lower level aspects
of the humanoid. And nally we need parallelism for the
cognitive aspects of the system as we are attempting to
build a system with more capability than can t on any
existing single processor.
But, in real-time embedded systems there is another
necessary reason for parallelism. It is the fact that there
are many things to be attended to happening in the
world continuously, independently of the agent. From
this comes the notion of an agent being situated in the
world. Not only must the agent devote attention to per-
haps hundreds of dierent sensors many times per sec-
ond, but it must also devote attention \down stream" in
the processing chain in many dierent places at many
times per second as the processed sensor data ows
through the system. The actual amounts of computation
needed to be done by each of these individual processes
is in fact quite small, so small that originally we formal-
ized them as augmented nite state machines (Brooks
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1986), although more recently we have thought of them
as real-time rules (Brooks 1990a). They are too small
to have a complete processor devoted to them in any
machine beyond a CM-2, and even there the processors
would be mostly idle. A better approach is to simulate
parallelism in a single conventional processor with its
own local memory.
Our humanoid robot will be situated in a real world
over which it has very little control. There will be people
present, moving about, changing the physical environs of
the humanoid, responding to actions of the humanoid,
and generating spontaneous behaviors themselves. The
task for the humanoid will be to interact with these ul-
timately unpredictable agents in a coherent way. It will
get a continuous large and rich stream of input data of
which it must make sense, relating it to past experiences
and future possibilities in the world. It will be a partic-
ipant in this world and must act with appropriate speed
and grace.
5 Hardware and Software Experimental
Platforms
We have extensive experience in building mobile robots.
The PI's have been directly involved in the design
and construction of over 35 dierent designs for mobile
robots, and with multiple instances of many of these
types of robots|over 100 robots in total.
In that previous work with mobile robots, we started
out thinking we would build one mobile robot that would
be a platform for research for a generation of gradu-
ate students (Brooks 1986). That soon changed as we
realized three things: (1) trying to design everything
into one robot caused too many compromises in our re-
search goals as early experiments soon pointed to mul-
tiple dierent sensor/actuator suites which needed to
be explored, (2) graduate students working on some-
what separate thesis projects needed their own robots if
they were to do extensive multi-hundred hours of opera-
tion experiments, rather than simple validation demon-
strations in controlled environments as were often con-
ducted in many research projects (Brooks 1991b) and (3)
by continually re-engineering our designs we gradually
built more robust robots with longer mean times between
catastrophic failures.6 Building many robots over a short
period of time led to rapid increases in performance over
a diverse set of robot morphologies (Brooks (1986), Con-
nell (1987), Horswill & Brooks (1988), Brooks (1989),
Connell (1990), Angle & Brooks (1990), Mataric (1992b),
Mataric (1992a), Ferrell (1993), Horswill (1993); see
Brooks (1990b) for an overview). At the same time,
a common software system (Brooks 1990a) was devel-
oped which ran on many dierent processors, but pro-
vided a common environment for programming all the
6This observation parallels the developments in digital
computers, where mean time between failures in the 1950's
was in the 20 minute range, extending to periods of a week
in the 1970's, and now typically we are not surprised when
our workstations run for months without needing to be
rebooted|this increase in robustness was bought with many
hundreds of iterations of the engineering cycle.
diverse robots. Brooks (1990b) gives a mid-course re-
view of some of those robots.
In this project too, we expect that there will be great
benets from building the humanoid repeatedly over the
life of the project and from running the software on mul-
tiple computer architectures, taking advantage in both
cases of technological developments that will occur inde-
pendently of this project. At the same time we will be
following a learning curve, increasing our engineering so-
phistication and the inherent robustness of the systems
we build.
To this end we have already started building the zero-
th version of the humanoid over the summer of 1993,
relying on current supplies in stock and largely o the
shelf components which are being purchased with mod-
est amounts of unrestricted funds from previous dona-
tions. At the same time a more extensive software de-
velopment eort is under way. We expect the zero-th
generation hardware to disappear within a few months,
but the software will form the kernel of future systems.
5.1 Brains
Our goal is to take advantage of the new availability of
massively parallel computation in dedicated machines.
We need parallelism because of the vast amounts of pro-
cessing that must be done in order to make sense of a
continuous and rich stream of perceptual data. We need
parallelism to coordinate the many actuation systems
that need to work in synchrony (e.g., the ocular system
and the neck must move in a coordinated fashion at time
to maintain image stability) and which need to be ser-
voed at high rates. We need parallelism in order to have
a continuously operating system that can be upgraded
without having to recompile, reload, and restart all of
the software that runs the stable lower level aspects of
the humanoid. And nally we need parallelism for the
cognitive aspects of the system as we are attempting to
build a \brain" with more capability than can t on any
existing single processor.
But in real-time embedded systems there is yet an-
other necessary reason for parallelism. It is the fact
that there are many things to be attended to, happen-
ing in the world continuously, independent of the agent.
From this comes the notion of an agent being situated
in the world. Not only must the agent devote atten-
tion to perhaps hundreds of dierent sensors many times
per second, but it must also devote attention \down
stream" in the processing chain in many dierent places
at many times per second as the processed sensor data
ows through the system. The actual amounts of com-
putation needed to be done by each of these individual
processes is in fact quite small, so small that originally
we formalized them as augmented nite state machines
(Brooks 1986), although more recently we have thought
of them as real-time rules (Brooks 1990a). They are too
small to have a complete processor devoted to them in
any machine beyond a CM-2, and even there the pro-
cessors would be mostly idle. A better approach is to
simulate parallelism in a single conventional processor
with its own local memory.
For instance, Ferrell (1993) built a software system
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to control a 19 actuator six legged robot using about 60
of its sensors. She implemented it as more than 1500
parallel processes running on a single Phillips 68070. (It
communicated with 7 peripheral processors which han-
dled sensor data collection and 100Hz motor servoing.)
Most of these parallel processes ran at rates varying be-
tween 10 and 25 Hertz. Each time each process ran, it
took at most a few dozen instructions before blocking,
waiting either for the passage of time or for some other
process to send it a message. Clearly, low cost context
switching was important.
The underlying computational model used on that
robot|and with many tens of other autonomous mobile
robots we have built|consisted of networks of message-
passing augmented nite state machines. Each of these
AFSMs was a separate process. The messages were sent
over predened `wires' from a specic transmitting to
a specic receiving AFSM. The messages were simple
numbers (typically 8 bits) whose meaning depended on
the designs of both the transmitter and the receiver. An
AFSM had additional registers which held the most re-
cent incoming message on any particular wire. This gives
a very simple model of parallelism, even simpler than
that of CSP (Hoare 1985). The registers could have their
values fed into a local combinatorial circuit to produce
new values for registers or to provide an output mes-
sage. The network of AFSMs was totally asynchronous,
but individual AFSMs could have xed duration monos-
tables which provided for dealing with the ow of time
in the outside world. The behavioral competence of the
system was improved by adding more behavior-specic
network to the existing network. This process was called
layering . This was a simplistic and crude analogy to
evolutionary development. As with evolution, at every
stage of the development the systems were tested. Each
of the layers was a behavior-producing piece of network
in its own right, although it might implicitly rely on the
presence of earlier pieces of network. For instance, an
explore layer did not need to explicitly avoid obstacles,
as the designer knew that a previous avoid layer would
take care of it. A xed priority arbitration scheme was
used to handle conicts.
On top of the AFSM substrate we used another
abstraction known as the Behavior Language, or BL
(Brooks 1990a), which was much easier for the user
to program with. The output of the BL compiler was
a standard set of augmented nite state machines; by
maintaining this compatibility all existing software could
be retained. When programming in BL the user has com-
plete access to full Common Lisp as a meta-language by
way of a macro mechanism. Thus the user could eas-
ily develop abstractions on top of BL, while still writ-
ing programs which compiled down to networks of AF-
SMs. In a sense, AFSMs played the role of assembly
language in normal high level computer languages. But
the structure of the AFSM networks enforced a program-
ming style which naturally compiled into very ecient
small processes. The structure of the Behavior Language
enforced a modularity where data sharing was restricted
to smallish sets of AFSMs, and whose only interfaces
were essentially asynchronous 1-deep buers.
In the humanoid project we believe much of the com-
putation, especially for the lower levels of the system,
will naturally be of a similar nature. We expect to
perform dierent experiments where in some cases the
higher level computations are of the same nature and in
other cases the higher levels will be much more symbolic
in nature, although the symbolic bindings will be re-
stricted to within individual processors. We need to use
software and hardware environments which give support
to these requirements without sacricing the high levels
of performance of which we wish to make use.
5.1.1 Software
For the software environment we have a number of
requirements:
 There should be a good software development en-
vironment.
 The system should be completely portable over
many hardware environments, so that we can up-
grade to new parallel machines over the lifetime of
this project.
 The system should provide ecient code for per-
ceptual processing such as vision.
 The system should let us write high level symbolic
programs when desired.
 The system language should be a standardized lan-
guage that is widely known and understood.
In summary our software environment should let us gain
easy access to high performance parallel computation.
We have chosen to use Common Lisp (Steele Jr. 1990)
as the substrate for all software development. This
gives us good programming environments including type
checked debugging, rapid prototyping, symbolic compu-
tation, easy ways of writing embedded language abstrac-
tions, and automatic storage management. We believe
that Common Lisp is superior to C (the other major
contender) in all of these aspects.
The problem then is how to use Lisp in a massively
parallel machine where each node may not have the vast
amounts of memory that we have become accustomed
to feeding Common Lisp implementations on standard
Unix boxes.
We have a long history of building high performance
Lisp compilers (Brooks, Gabriel & Steele Jr. 1982), in-
cluding one of the two most common commercial Lisp
compilers on the market; Lucid Lisp|Brooks, Posner,
McDonald, White, Benson & Gabriel (1986).
Recently we have developed L (Brooks 1993), a re-
targetable small ecient Lisp which is a downwardly
compatible subset of Common Lisp. When compiled
for a 68000 based machine the load image (without the
compiler) is only 140K bytes, but includes multiple val-
ues, strings, characters, arrays, a simplied but com-
patible package system, all the \ordinary" aspects of
format, backquote and comma, setf etc., full Common
Lisp lambda lists including optionals and keyword argu-
ments, macros, an inspector, a debugger, defstruct (in-
tegrated with the inspector), block, catch, and throw,
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etc., full dynamic closures, a full lexical interpreter, oat-
ing point, fast garbage collection, and so on. The com-
piler runs in time linear in the size of an input expression,
except in the presence of lexical closures. It neverthe-
less produces highly optimized code in most cases. L is
missing flet and labels, generic arithmetic, bignums,
rationals, complex numbers, the library of sequence func-
tions (which can be written within L) and esoteric parts
of format and packages.
The L system is an intellectual descendent of the dy-
namically retargetable Lucid Lisp compiler (Brooks et al.
1986) and the dynamically retargetable Behavior Lan-
guage compiler (Brooks 1990a). The system is totally
written in L with machine dependent backends for re-
targetting. The rst backend is for the Motorola 68020
(and upwards) family, but it is easily retargeted to new
architectures. The process consists of writing a simple
machine description, providing code templates for about
100 primitive procedures (e.g., xed precision integer +,
*, =, etc., string indexing CHAR and other accessors, CAR,
CDR, etc.), code macro expansion for about 20 pseudo
instructions (e.g, procedure call, procedure exit, check-
ing correct number of arguments, linking CATCH frames,
etc.) and two corresponding sets of assembler routines
which are too big to be expanded as code templates ev-
ery time, but are so critical in speed that they need to be
written in machine language, without the overhead of a
procedure call, rather than in Lisp (e.g., CONS, spreading
of multiple values on the stack, etc.). There is a version
of the I/O system which operates by calling C routines
(e.g., fgetchar, etc.; this is how the Macintosh version
of L runs) so it is rather simple to port the system to any
hardware platform we might choose to use in the future.
Note carefully the intention here: L is to be the de-
livery vehicle running on the brain hardware of the hu-
manoid, potentially on hundreds or thousands of small
processors. Since it is fully downward compatible with
Common Lisp however, we can carry out code develop-
ment and debugging on standard work stations with full
programming environments (e.g., in Macintosh Common
Lisp, or Lucid Common Lisp with Emacs 19 on a Unix
box, or in the Harlequin programming environment on a
Unix box). We can then dynamically link code into the
running system on our parallel processors.
There are two remaining problems: (1) how to main-
tain super critical real-time performance when using a
Lisp system without hard ephemeral garbage collection,
and (2) how to get the level of within-processor paral-
lelism described earlier.
The structure of L's implementation is such that mul-
tiple independent heaps can be maintained within a sin-
gle address space, sharing all the code and data segments
of the Lisp proper. In this way super-critical portions of
a system can be placed in a heap where no consing is oc-
curring, and hence there is no possibility that they will
be blocked by garbage collection.
The Behavior Language (Brooks 1990a) is an exam-
ple of a compiler which builds special purpose static
schedulers for low overhead parallelism. Each process
ran until blocked and the syntax of the language forced
there to always be a blocking condition, so there was no
need for pre-emptive scheduling. Additionally the syn-
tax and semantics of the language guaranteed that there
would be zero stack context needed to be saved when a
blocking condition was reached. We will need to build
a new scheduling system with L to address similar is-
sues in this project. To t in with the philosophy of the
rest of the system it must be a dynamic scheduler so
that new processes can be added and deleted as a user
types to the Lisp listener of a particular processor. Rea-
sonably straightforward data structures can keep these
costs to manageable levels. It is rather straightforward
to build a phase into the L compiler which can recognize
the situations described above. Thus it is straightfor-
ward to implement a set of macros which will provide a
language abstraction on top of Lisp which will provide
all the functionality of the Behavior Language and which
will additionally let us have dynamic scheduling. Almost
certainly a pre-emptive scheduler will be needed in ad-
dition, as it would be dicult to enforce a computation
time limit syntactically when Common Lisp will essen-
tially be available to the programmer|at the very least
the case of the pre-emptive scheduler having to strike
down a process will be useful as a safety device, and
will also act as a debugging tool for the user to iden-
tify time critical computations which are stressing the
bounded computation style of writing. In other cases
static analysis will be able to determine maximum stack
requirements for a particular process, and so heap allo-
cated stacks will be usable7.
The software system so far described will be used to
implement crude forms of `brain models', where compu-
tations will be organized in ways inspired by the sorts of
anatomical divisions we see occurring in animal brains.
Note that we are not saying we will build a model of a
particular brain, but rather there will be a modularity in-
spired by such components as visual cortex, auditory cor-
tex, etc., and within and across those components there
will be further modularity, e.g., a particular subsystem
to implement the vestibulo-ocular response (VOR).
Thus besides on-processor parallelism we will need to
provide a modularity tool that packages processes into
groups and limits data sharing between them. Each
package will reside on a single processor, but often
processors will host many such packages. A package
that communicates with another package should be in-
sulated at the syntax level from knowing whether the
other package is on the same or a dierent proces-
sor. The communication medium between such packages
will again be 1-deep buers without queuing or receipt
acknowledgment|any such acknowledgment will need to
be implemented as a backward channel, much as we see
throughout the cortex (Churchland & Sejnowski 1992).
This packaging system can be implemented in Common
Lisp as a macro package.
We expect all such system level software development
to be completed in the rst twelve months of the project.
7The problem with heap allocated stacks in the general




The computational model presented in the previ-
ous section is somewhat dierent from that usually as-
sumed in high performance parallel computer applica-
tions. Typically (Cypher et al. 1993) there is a strong
bias on system requirements from the sort of benchmarks
that are used to evaluate performance. The standard
benchmarks for modern high performance computation
seem to be Fortran codes for hydrodynamics, molecu-
lar simulations, or graphics rendering. We are propos-
ing a very dierent application with very dierent re-
quirements; in particular we require real-time response
to a wide variety of external and internal events, we re-
quire good symbolic computation performance, we re-
quire only integer rather than high performance oat-
ing point operations,8 we require delivery of messages
only to specic sites determined at program design time,
rather than at run-time, and we require the ability to do
very fast context switches because of the large number
of parallel processes that we intend to run on each indi-
vidual processor.
The fact that we will not need to support pointer ref-
erences across the computational substrate will mean
that we can rely on much simpler, and therefore
higher performance, parallel computers than many other
researchers|we will not have to worry about a consis-
tent global memory, cache coherence, or arbitrary mes-
sage routing. Since these are dierent requirements than
those that are normally considered, we have to make
some measurements with actual programs before we can
we can make an intelligent o the shelf choice of com-
puter hardware.
In order to answer some of these questions we are cur-
rently building a zero-th generation parallel computer. It
is being built on a very low budget with o the shelf com-
ponents wherever possible (a few fairly simple printed
circuit boards need to be fabricated). The processors
are 16Mhz Motorola 68332s on a standard board built
by Vesta Technology. These plug 16 to a backplane.
The backplane provides each processor with six commu-
nications ports (using the integrated timing processor
unit to generate the required signals along with spe-
cial chip select and standard address and data lines)
and a peripheral processor port. The communications
ports will be hand-wired with patch cables, building a
xed topology network. (The cables incorporate a single
dual ported RAM (8K by 16 bits) that itself includes
hardware semaphores writable and readable by the two
processors being connected.) Background processes run-
ning on the 68332 operating system provide sustained
rate transfers of 60Hz packets of 4K bytes on each port,
with higher peak rates if desired. These sustained rates
do consume processing cycles from the 68332. On non-
vision processors we expect much lower rates will be
needed, and even on vision processors we can proba-
bly reduce the packet frequency to around 15Hz. Each
8Consider the dynamic range possible in single signal
channels in the human brain and it soon becomes apparent
that all that we wish to do is certainly achievable with nei-
ther span of 600 orders of magnitude, or 47 signicant binary
digits.
processor has an operating system, L, and the dynamic
scheduler residing in 1M of EPROM. There is 1M of
RAM for program, stack and heap space. Up to 256
processors can be connected together.
Up to 16 backplanes can be connected to a single front
end processor (FEP) via a shared 500K baud serial line
to a SCSI emulator. A large network of 68332s can span
many FEPs if we choose to extend the construction of
this zero-th prototype. Initially we will use a Macintosh
as a FEP. Software written in Macintosh Common Lisp
on the FEP will provide disk I/O services to the 68332's,
monitor status and health packets from them, and pro-
vide the user with a Lisp listener to any processor they
might choose.
The zero-th version uses the standard Motorola SPI
(serial peripheral interface) to communicate with up to
16 Motorola 6811 processors per 68332. These are a sin-
gle chip processor with onboard EEPROM (2K bytes)
and RAM (256 bytes), including a timer system, an SPI
interface, and 8 channels of analog to digital conversion.
We are building a small custom board for this proces-
sor that includes opto-isolated motor drivers and some
standard analog support for sensors9.
We expect our rst backplane to be operational by
August 1st, 1993 so that we can commence experiments
with our rst prototype body. We will collect statistics
on inter-processor communication throughput, eects of
latency, and other measures so that we can better choose
a larger scale parallel processor for more serious versions
of the humanoid.
In the meantime, however, there are certain develop-
ments on the horizon within the MIT Articial Intel-
ligence Lab which we expect to capitalize upon in or-
der to dramatically upgrade our computational systems
for early vision, and hence the resolution at which we
can aord to process images in real time. The rst of
these, expected in the fall will be a somewhat similar
distributed processing system based on the much higher
performance Texas Instrument C40, which comes with
built in support for xed topology message passing. We
expect these systems to be available in the Fall '93 time-
frame. In October '94 we expect to be able to make use
of the Abacus system, a bit level recongurable vision
front-end processor being built under ARPA sponsorship
which promises Tera-op performance on 16 bit xed pre-
cision operands. Both these systems will be simply inte-
grable with our zero-th order parallel processor via the
standard dual-ported RAM protocol that we are using.
5.2 Bodies
As with the computational hardware, we are also cur-
rently engaged in building a zero-th generation body
for early experimentation and design renement towards
more serious constructions within the scope of this pro-
9We currently have 28 operational robots in our labs each
with between 3 and 5 of these 6811 processors, and several
dozen other robots with at least 1 such processor on board.
We have great experience in writing compiler backends for
these processors (including BL) and great experience in us-
ing them for all sorts of servoing, sensor monitoring, and
communications tasks.
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posal. We are presently limited by budgetary constraints
to building an immobile, armless, deaf, torso with only
black and white vision.
In the following subsections we outline the constraints
and requirements on a full scale humanoid body and also
include where relevant details of our zero-th level proto-
type.
5.2.1 Eyes
There has been quite a lot of recent work on animate
vision using saccading stereo cameras, most notably at
Rochester (Ballard 1989), (Coombs 1992), but also more
recently at many other institutions, such as Oxford Uni-
versity.
The humanoid needs a head with high mechanical
performance eyeballs and foveated vision if it is to be
able to participate in the world with people in a natu-
ral way. Even our earliest heads will include two eyes,
with foveated vision, able to pan and tilt as a unit, and
with independent saccading ability (three saccades per
second) and vergence control of the eyes. Fundamen-
tal vision based behaviors will include a visually cali-
brated vestibular-ocular reex, smooth pursuit, visually
calibrated saccades, and object centered foveal relative
depth stereo. Independent visual systems will provide
peripheral and foveal motion cues, color discrimination,
human face pop-outs, and eventually face recognition.
Over the course of the project, object recognition based
based on \representations" from body schemas and ma-
nipulation interactions will be developed. This is com-
pletely dierent from any conventional object recogni-
tion schemes, and can not be attempted without an in-
tegrated vision and manipulation environment as we pro-
pose.
The eyeballs need to be able to saccade up to about
three times per second, stabilizing for 250ms at each
stop. Additionally the yaw axes should be controllable
for vergence to a common point and drivable in a man-
ner appropriate for smooth pursuit and for image stabi-
lization as part of a vestibulo-ocular response (VOR) to
head movement. The eyeballs do not need to be force
or torque controlled but they do need good fast position
and velocity control. We have previously built a sin-
gle eyeball, A-eye, on which we implemented a model of
VOR, ocular-kinetic response (OKR) and saccades, all
of which used dynamic visually based calibration (Viola
1990).
Other active vision systems have had both eyeballs
mounted on a single tilt axis. We will begin experiments
with separate tilt axes but if we nd that relative tilt
motion is not very useful we will back o from this re-
quirement in later versions of the head.
The cameras need to cover a wide eld of view, prefer-
ably close to 180 degrees, while also giving a foveated
central region. Ideally the images should be RGB (rather
than the very poor color signal of standard NTSC). A
resolution of 512 by 512 at both the coarse and ne scale
is desirable.
Our zero-th version of the cameras are black and white
only. Each eyeball consists of two small lightweight cam-
eras mounted with parallel axes. One gives a 115 degree
eld of view and the other gives a 20 degree foveated
region. In order to handle the images in real time in our
zero-th parallel processor we will subsample the images
to be much smaller than the ideal.
Later versions of the head will have full RGB color
cameras, wider angles for the peripheral vision, much
ner grain sampling of the images, and perhaps a col-
inear optics set up using optical ber cables and beam
splitters. With more sophisticated high speed process-
ing available we will also be able to do experiments with
log-polar image representations.
5.2.2 Ears, Voice
Almost no work has been done on sound understand-
ing, as distinct from speech understanding. This project
will start on sound understanding to provide a much
more solid processing base for later work on speech in-
put. Early behavior layers will spatially correlate noises
with visual events, and spatial registration will be con-
tinuously self calibrating. Eorts will concentrate on us-
ing this physical cross-correlation as a basis for reliably
pulling out interesting events from background noise,
and mimicking the cocktail party eect of being able
to focus attention on particular sound sources. Visual
correlation with face pop-outs, etc., will then be used
to be able to extract human sound streams. Work will
proceed on using these sounds streams to mimic infant's
abilities to ignore language dependent irrelevances. By
the time we get to elementary speech we will therefore
have a system able to work in noisy environments and
accustomed to multiple speakers with varying accents.
Sound perception will consist of three high quality
microphones. (Although the human head uses only two
auditory inputs, it relies heavily on the shape of the ex-
ternal ear in determining the vertical component of di-
rectional sound source.) Sound generation will be ac-
complished using a speaker.
Sound is critical for several aspects of the robot's ac-
tivity. First, sound provides immediate feedback for mo-
tor manipulation and positioning. Babies learn to nd
and use their hands by batting at and manipulating toys
that jingle and rattle. Adults use such cues as contact
noises|the sound of an object hitting the table|to pro-
vide feedback to motor systems. Second, sound aids
in socialization even before the emergence of language.
Patterns such as turn-taking and mimicry are critical
parts of children's development, and adults use guttural
gestures to express attitudes and other conversational
cues. Certain signal tones indicate encouragement or
disapproval to all ages and stages of development. Fi-
nally, even pre-verbal children use sound eectively to
convey intent; until our robots develop true language,
other sounds will necessarily be a major source of com-
munication.
5.2.3 Torsos
In order for the humanoid to be able to participate in
the same sorts of body metaphors as are used by humans,
it needs to have a symmetric human-like torso. It needs
to be able to experience imbalance, feel symmetry, learn
to coordinate head and body motion for stable vision,
and be able to experience relief when it relaxes its body.
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Additionally the torso must be able to support the head,
the arms, and any objects they grasp.
The torsos we build will initially have a three degree
of freedom hip, with the axes passing through a common
point, capable of leaning and twisting to any position in
about three seconds|somewhat slower than a human.
The neck will also have three degrees of freedom, with
the axes passing through a common point which will also
lie along the spinal axis of the body. The head will be
capable of yawing at 90 degrees per second|less than
peak human speed, but well within the range of natural
human motions. As we build later versions we expect to
increase these performance gures to more closely match
the abilities of a human.
Apart from the normal sorts of kinematic sensors, the
torso needs a number of additional sensors specically
aimed at providing input fodder for the development of
bodily metaphors. In particular, strain gauges on the
spine can give the system a feel for its posture and the
symmetry of a particular conguration, plus a little in-
formation about any additional load the torso might bear
when an arm picks up something heavy. Heat sensors on
the motors and the motor drivers will give feedback as
to how much work has been done by the body recently,
and current sensors on the motors will give an indication
of how hard the system is working instantaneously.
Our zero-th level torso is roughly 18 inches from the
base of the spine to the base of the neck. This corre-
sponds to a smallish adult. It uses DC motors with built
in gearboxes. The main concern we have is how quiet it
will be, as we do not want the sound perception system
to be overwhelmed by body noise.
Later versions of the torsos will have touch sensors
integrated around the body, will have more compliant
motion, will be quieter, and will need to provide better
cabling ducts so that the cables can all feed out through
a lower body outlet.
5.2.4 Arms
The eventual manipulator system will be a compliant
multi-degree of freedom arm with a rather simple hand.
(A better hand would be nice, but hand research is not
yet at a point where we can get an interesting, easy-to
use, o-the-shelf hand.) The arm will be safe enough
that humans can interact with it, handing it things and
taking things from it. The arm will be compliant enough
that the system will be able to explore its own body|
for instance, by touching its head system|so that it will
be able to develop its own body metaphors. The full
design of the even the rst pair of arms is not yet com-
pletely worked out, and current funding does not permit
the inclusion of arms on the zero-th level humanoid. In
this section, we describe our desiderata for the arms and
hands.
We want the arms to be very compliant yet still able
to lift weights of a few pounds so that they can interact
with human artifacts in interesting ways. Additionally
we want the arms to have redundant degrees of freedom
(rather than the six seen in a standard commercial robot
arm), so that in many circumstances we can `burn' some
of those degrees of freedom in order to align a single
joint so that the joint coordinates and task coordinates
very nearly match. This will greatly simplify control of
manipulation. It is the sort of thing people do all the
time: for example, when bracing an elbow or the base
of the palm (or even their middle and last two ngers)
on a table to stabilize the hand during some delicate (or
not so delicate) manipulation.
The hands in the rst instances will be quite simple;
devices that can grasp from above relying heavily on
mechanical compliance|they may have as few as one
degree of control freedom.
More sophisticated, however, will be the sensing on
the arms and hands. We will use forms of conductive
rubber to get a sense of touch over the surface of the
arm, so that it can detect (compliant) collisions it might
participate in. As with the torso there will be liberal use
of strain gauges, heat sensors and current sensors so that
the system can have a `feel' for how its arms are being
used and how they are performing.
We also expect to move towards a more sophisticated
type of hand in later years of this project. Initially, un-
fortunately, we will be forced to use motions of the upper
joints of the arm for ne manipulation tasks. More so-
phisticated hands will allow us to use nger motions,
with much lower inertias, to carry out these tasks.
6 Development Plan
We plan on modeling the brain at a level above the neural
level, but below what would normally be thought of as
the cognitive level.
We understand abstraction well enough to know how
to engineer a system that has similar properties and con-
nections to the human brain without having to model its
detailed local wiring. At the same time it is clear from
the literature that there is no agreement on how things
are really organized computationally at higher or modu-
lar levels, or indeed whether it even makes sense to talk
about modules of the brain (e.g., short term memory,
and long term memory) as generative structures.
Nevertheless, we expect to be guided, or one might
say inspired, by what is known about the high level con-
nectivity within the human brain (although admittedly
much of our knowledge actually comes from macaques
and other primates and is only extrapolated to be true
of humans, a problem of concern to some brain scien-
tists (Crick & Jones 1993)). Thus for instance we ex-
pect to have identiable clusters of processors which we
will be able to point to and say they are performing a
role similar to that of the cerebellum (e.g., rening gross
motor commands into coordinated smooth motions), or
the cortex (e.g., some aspects of searching generaliza-
tion/specialization hierarchies in object recognition (Ull-
man 1991)).
At another level we will directly model human sys-
tems where they are known in some detail. For instance
there is quite a lot known about the control of eye move-
ments in humans (again mostly extrapolated from work
with monkeys) and we will build in a vestibulo-ocular re-
sponse (VOR), OKR, smooth pursuit, and saccades us-
ing the best evidence available on how this is organized
in humans (Lisberger 1988).
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A third level of modeling or inspiration that we will
use is at the developmental level. For instance once
we have some sound understanding developed, we will
use models of what happens in child language develop-
ment to explore ways of connecting physical actions in
the world to a ground of language and the development
of symbols (Bates 1979), (Bates, Bretherton & Snyder
1988), including indexical (Lempert & Kinsbourne 1985)
and turn-taking behavior, interpretation of tone and fa-
cial expressions and the early use of memorized phrases.
Since we will have a number of faculty, post-doctoral
fellows, and graduate students working on concurrent
research projects, and since we will have a number of
concurrently active humanoid robots, not all pieces that
are developed will be intended to t together exactly.
Some will be incompatible experiments in alternate ways
of building subsystems, or putting them together. Some
will be pushing on particular issues in language, say, that
may not be very related to some particular other issues,
e.g., saccades. Also, quite clearly, at this stage we can
not have a development plan fully worked out for ve
years, as many of the early results will change the way
we think about the problems and what should be the
next steps.
In gure 1, we summarize our current plans for devel-
oping software systems on board our series of humanoids.
In many cases there will be earlier work o-board the
robots, but to keep clutter down in the diagram we have
omitted that work here.
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